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Abstract 
We present a two-level coalition formation approach 
based on a centralized optimization model on the upper 
level, and a distributed agent-negotiation model on the 
lower level. This approach allows us to balance agent 
self-interests against a high joint utility. Experimental 
results show that the two-level coalition formation 
mechanism will increase not only the overall utility of the 
coalition, but also the individual utility of most 
participating agents. The results also suggest it is better 
for the agents to be partially cooperative rather than 
either fully cooperative or self-interested in our setting. 
 
1. Introduction 
Coalition formation in Multi-Agent systems (MAS) has 
been well studied in recent years. Until now almost all 
related work on coalition formation can be categorized 
into two general classes: computation-oriented approach 
and negotiation-oriented approach. In computation-
oriented approach, agents are group-rational with little or 
no self-interests and they work to find a solution that 
increase their joint utility – the sum of the utilities of all 
involved agents. A central authority will take charge of the 
whole coalition formation process and it is able to achieve 
a high-quality coalition configuration by extensive 
calculation. On the contrary, for a negotiation-oriented 
approach, the agents are self-interested and their goals are 
to maximize their own utilities. Agents will form coalition 
by themselves by negotiating with each other. Both of 
these two approaches have their own strength and 
weakness. Computation-oriented approach tries to 
maximize the joint utility of the group by neglecting each 
agent’ individual interest; Negotiation-oriented approach 
tries to satisfy agents’ self interests but the joint utility of 
the group is somehow sacrificed.  
Little work has been done to achieve a balance between 
these two extreme approaches that gives agents certain 
level of freedom and is still able to achieve a high joint 
utility of the group. We believe that as the sophistication 
of multi-agent system increases, agents will not be purely 
self-interested, seeking to maximize their own utility, nor 
fully cooperative working to maximize the joint utility. It 
is more realistic to expect agents being something in the 
middle, i.e. partially cooperative in the coalition formation 
process. Motivated by this, we propose a framework in 
which coalition formation is performed at two levels. The 
upper-level deals with high-level goals (increase group 
utility) and the lower-level works to refine the coalition 
formed in the upper-level. In the upper-level, agents are 
cooperative and a central host will adopt the computation-
oriented approach to form coalitions. In the lower-level, 
agents are concerned with their own interests and they can 
negotiate with each other on prices in order to maximize 
their own utilities. These two levels are tightly integrated 
with each other and together they manage to achieve a 
balance between agents’ self interests and joint utility of 
the group. The upper-level coalition formation process 
will encourage agents to be partially cooperative during 
the lower-level negotiation process. In turn, agents’ 
attitude in the lower-level negotiation process will affect 
how the coalitions are formed in the upper-level. Agents 
in the system can dynamically change their attitudes 
towards negotiation. Jobs arrive at the coalition formation 
system in batches and agents will revise their attitudes 
after fulfilling each batch of the jobs. An agent’s attitude 
will be affected by its long-term goal, current situation, 
other agents’ attitudes towards negotiation, etc.  
 
2. Related works 
 [1] developed a measure of social consciousness 
called “brownie points” (BP) which encourage self-
interested agents to be partially cooperative during 
negotiation. [2] proposed a classification of coalition 
formation problem based on three driving factors (job 
demands, resource availability and profit objective). The 
agents in that paper are fully cooperative and there exists 
a central authority that performs coalition formation. [3] 
proposed a protocol for price negotiation to increase the 
chances of coalition formation. [4] presented a stable 
buyer coalition formation scheme for e-markets by 
considering volume discounts. In [5], the idea of a round 
in continuous double auctions was introduced. . A history 
of past transaction prices was maintained to guide agents   
in their subsequent bidding behavior. Each agent is 
associated with a utility function that describes its attitude 
towards risk. Our work makes use of their ideas of a 
history list and negotiation round. In [6], the authors 
provided two algorithms for self-interested agents to form 
coalition in a non-super-additive environment. [7] 
proposed an iterative distributed greedy algorithm for 
coalition formation for fully cooperative agents. This is a 
computation-oriented approach and by extensive 
calculation, it can achieve a high-quality coalition 
configuration. [8] believed that reciprocity is the 
foundational principle for promoting cooperative behavior 
among self-interested agents. The principle of reciprocity 
means that agents help others who have helped them in the 
past or can help them in the future. This paper is 
motivated by the idea in [9], where the authors presented a 
negotiation framework in which the negotiation process is 
performed at two levels. The upper level deals with the 
formation of high-level goals and objective for the agent 
and the lower-level deals with feasibility and 
implementation operations. [10] introduced an integrative 
negotiation mechanism which enables agents to choose 
any attitude in the spectrum between self-interested and 
fully cooperative. It suggested that agents should be 
partially cooperative in their negotiation with other agents.   
 
3. Preliminaries 
In this section, we present definitions, notations and 
assumptions used throughout this paper.  
 
3.1. Jobs   
There are m jobs in the system that arrive in batches. 
Each job i consists of a fixed k number of sub-jobs. Each 
sub-job j requires a unique resource of its type. Let aij 
denote the quantity of resources required for performing 
job i sub-job j. Each job i is associated with a revenue 
value Ri and the profit for performing this job Pi can be 
derived from subtracting from Ri the sum of the final bid 
prices of the agents in the coalition.  
 
3.2. Agents 
There are n agents denoted as {A1, A2, …, An}. Each 
agent Ai has a vector of non-negative resource capacities 
Ci = [ci1, ci2,…, cik], where cij is agent Ai’s quantity of 
resource capable of performing  sub-job j. A sub-job may 
be performed by one or more agents. Each agent has a 
price vector Pi = [ ]ikii ρρρ ,, 21 , where ijρ  is the unit bid 
price for Ai to perform sub-job j, which is a negotiable 
variable within the range [ ]maxmin, ijij ρρ , where minijρ  and maxijρ  
are Ai’s minimum and maximum unit bid price for 
performing sub-job j respectively. Each agent has a set of 
attitudes toward negotiation denoted as cooperative 
factors (CF). The CF value ranges from 0 to 1.0 where a 
higher CF value means a more cooperative attitude. For 
each batch of jobs that arrives, the value of ijρ  is a 
negotiable variable between minijρ
 and maxijρ
 depending on 
its attitude toward negotiation at that juncture. Its profit 
for performing sub-job j is hence the difference between 
its revenue (i.e.
ijρ  times resource usage) and cost 
(conveniently defined as minijρ  times resource usage).  
 
3.3. Coalition  
A coalition is defined as a group of agents to achieve 
a common job. Each coalition is associated with a 
coalition value, which is intuitively defined as the joint 
utility that the members of a coalition derive by 
cooperating to satisfy a specific job. In this paper, we 
allow overlapping coalitions, i.e. each agent can belong 
to more than one coalitions. A coalition is termed 
feasible if the utility gained from forming this coalition is 
above certain threshold value and defined as infeasible 
otherwise. In this paper, we simply define a coalition as 
feasible if the total bid price for all agents does not 
exceed the revenue of the job. Coalitions which violate 
the pricing constraint are termed infeasible and there is a 
need to get agents in an infeasible coalition to reduce 
their individual bid prices. 
 
3.4. Coalition host and negotiation host 
There are two hosts in the system: a coalition formation 
host (denoted CH) and a negotiation host (denoted NH). 
CH takes charge of upper-level coalition formation 
process in which it will form a set of coalitions for the 
current batch of jobs. NH is responsible for coordinating 
the lower-level negotiation process. It calculates and sends 
the proposed drop price to each agent in the infeasible 
coalition. Upon receiving the responses from the agents, 
NH will either re-propose drop prices for agents or 
announce the failure of negotiation. NH will pass each 
agent’s behavior to CH after fulfilling each batch of jobs. 
This information will be used to measure the 
cooperativeness of each agent and will affect the coalition 
formation process for the next batch of jobs.  
  
3.5. Agent behavior 
Each agent i is associated with a probability function 
iPr  that captures its past bidding behavior, where )(Pr zi , 
iz α≤≤0 , gives the probability (or willingness) that agent 
i has offered z percent discount off its initial bid price in 
the past. The expected value of iPr  is denoted by EPri. In 
this paper, iPr  is represented as a monotonically 
decreasing step function with it  number of intervals. Each 
agent’s past behavior is known to other agents in the 
system. Other agents will use the agent’s past behavior to 
estimate its future behavior and this estimation will be 
used by agents to make decisions during the negotiation. 
 
3.6. Coalition factor (CF) vs. coalition level (CL) 
As mentioned above, each agent has a set of attitudes 
toward negotiation denoted as coalition factor (CF). CF 
value represents how cooperative the agent is willing to be 
toward negotiation and is determined by the agent itself. 
Note that the CF value is unknown to NH as it is the 
agent’s own strategy and should not be revealed to others. 
Instead, NH derives the cooperative level (CL) of the 
agent by observing its bidding behavior in response to the 
previous batch of jobs. In short, CF and CL are two 
different measures of agent’s attitude toward negotiation. 
CF is determined by the agent itself while CL is 
determined by NH.  
 
4. Upper level coalition formation 
We will now present the two-level coalition formation 
framework in detail. In our model, we assume that jobs 
arrive in batches. The objective is to form coalitions for 
each batch of jobs in the upper-level coalition formation 
process and invoke the lower-level negotiation process 
only when some formed coalitions in the upper-level are 
infeasible. Task (i.e. job) allocation via coalition 
formation problem is NP-hard as it can be reduced from 
multi-dimensional knapsack problem which is a well-
known NP-hard problem [2]. Here we propose a 
polynomial time heuristic algorithm to form coalitions by 
maximizing the profit of the most valuable coalition, and 
continue recursively until all the jobs have been fulfilled 
or no more coalition can be formed (see [2] for more 
details). In this way, we expect the overall profit of the 
system to be maximized as well. 
 
4.1. Coalition formation algorithm 
There are 3 stages in our coalition formation algorithm: 
Stage 1: Preprocessing. For each sub-job j, we sort all 
agents that have capabilities for the sub-job in the 
increasing order of their unit decision prices. We call the 
sorted list the agent list for sub-job j. 
Stage 2: Coalition value computation. For each 
remaining job i in the job list and for each sub-task j of 
job i, pick agents in order from the agent list of sub-job j 
until job i’s resource requirement for sub-job j is met. 
Compute its coalition value according to following: 
ikikiiii
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f and Rt is the total remaining 
capacities (of all agents) for resource t before allocating 
job i.  
Stage 3: Coalition formation. Form the coalition for the 
job with highest coalition value among all jobs. 
1. Choose the highest among all coalition values 
computed in Stage 2. That coalition will be 
formed and the corresponding job for it would be 
assigned to the coalition. 
2. For each agent that becomes a member of the 
coalition formed, the resource capabilities are 
updated. 
3. The job assigned to the coalition at this iteration is 
removed from the job list. 
4. Go to Stage 2. Stop when no more jobs are left or 
no more coalitions can be formed. 
 
4.2. Computing agent’s unit decision price 
The agent’s unit decision price is determined by the 
agent’s current unit bid price as well as its CL presented 
during serving last batch of jobs. Here is how we measure 
agent’s CL and its unit decision price: let dijave be agent i’s 
average drop price for sub-job j, pij and p’ij be its unit bid 
price for the last and current batch of jobs, and uij be agent 
i’s unit decision price for sub-job j, agent i’s CL for sub-
job j is determined by 
ij
ave
ij
p
d
which represents the 
percentage of unit bid price that the agent has agreed to 
drop for last batch of jobs. Thus we have )1('
ij
ave
ij
ijij p
d
pu −= .  
 
5. Lower level agent negotiation 
 
5.1. Lower-level negotiation protocol  
The set of infeasible coalitions that have been formed 
in the upper-level are then passed to the lower-level 
negotiation system. Here, NH tries to persuade agents to 
drop their respective bid prices by a proposed drop price. 
Each agent performs its own computation and either 
accepts or rejects this amount. In the latter case, it either 
re-proposes another bid price or simply rejects the host. 
When NH receives rejections or re-proposals, it re-
computes the drop price based on the current state and the 
history of the negotiation process. Subsequently, the agent 
is informed of this new drop price and does its 
computation to decide the next step. These exchanges will 
iterate until the coalition either becomes feasible or when 
a predetermined number of rounds has elapsed.  
In the following, we consider an infeasible coalition C 
as an example and present how the negotiation proceeds 
among the agents in the coalition. Let C  denote the size 
of coalition, i.e. the number of agents in coalition C, R be 
the revenue of the job that is associated with the coalition. 
For simplicity, since we are dealing with only one job at a 
time, the index j is dropped and all notations henceforth 
will refer to the current job being negotiated. 
The current state information rCrrr dddD ||21 ,...,,=  is 
computed at the start of each negotiation round r and rid  
denotes agent i's confirmed drop price after round r. Let 
r
iρ be agent i’s unit bid price at round r then we 
have 10 −−= riiri dρρ .Let 
∈∀
=
rr
i Dd
r
i
r dδ  and r
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i
r R
i
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denote the amount in which the sum of all agents’ bid 
prices is in excess of the job revenue during round r. Let 
rπ  denote the sum of all agents’ bid prices at during 
round r. The proposed drop price of each agent i at round 
r is given by 

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Upon receiving the proposed drop price from NH, 
agents will decide whether they should accept or reject the 
proposal. The key measure used in its decision making is 
its expected revenue. Let riX  be the random variable that 
denotes the revenue of agent i during r; riC  be the ordered 
set of agents except agent i during round r; 1|| −= riCk ; 
][tC ri  be the tth agent in riC  respectively; ( )∞∞∞ = kρρσ ,...,1  
and ( )rkrr ρρσ ,...,1= be the tuples of minimum and current 
round bid prices of all agents in riC ; rθ  denote the sum of 
initial bid prices of agents during round r; 
rrr R θδξ −−= ; ∞−= irriQ ρξ ; riG  be the set of 
( )011 ,,,, iirr ρρξσσ ∞−−∞ -constrained-k-integer partitions of 
r
iQ  (see [3] for technical details);  g be an arbitrary tuple 
in riG  and tg  be the t
th element of g. The expected 
revenue of agent i at round r is: 
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where ].[tCa ri=  If ∞=][E riX  because no partitions can be 
formed ( ∅=riG ), the agent will reject the proposed drop 
price and set 1−= riri ρρ  (see [3] for more details). 
 
5.2. Agent decision making strategy  
In our problem, as the agent’s attitude toward 
negotiation will be used by CH to form coalition, the 
agent has to be partially cooperative in order to have a 
high chance to join the coalition in the future. For this 
purpose, we introduce a new term ridCF *  which denotes 
the percentage of the proposed drop price agent i is 
willing to accept. This new term is directly affected by the 
agent’s current CF and represents how much an agent is 
willing to sacrifice its own profit to make the coalition 
feasible. Hence, agent i’s decision making strategy 
becomes as follows:    
If ][E* riririri XdCFd ≥+−ρ and miniriri d ρρ ≥− , then agent i 
will accept the proposed drop price. Otherwise, it will 
reject the proposal and re-propose ][E1 riri X=+ρ . 
 
5.3. Dynamic adjustment of agent’s attitude 
In our model, each agent can dynamically adjust its 
attitude toward negotiation. This is necessary to support 
the agent’s negotiation in a complex organizational 
context. It also strengthens our system’s capability of 
modeling human decision makers. 
We define the resource utilization rate of the agent for 
the previous batch of jobs as the ratio of its revenue 
gained from serving last batch of jobs over the estimated 
value of the agent’s total resource before serving the last 
batch of jobs. After serving each batch of jobs, an agent 
will compare its own resource utilization rate with other 
agents’ in the system. Let ui be agent i’s resource 
utilization rate, uave be the average of other agents’ 
resource utilization rates, iCF  be agent i’s CF for the last 
batch of jobs and 'iCF  be the new CF after adjustment. The 
following shows how the agent adjusts its attitude 
periodically.  
(i) If α>−
i
avei
u
uu , agent i decreases its CF by 0.1 if it is 
greater or equal than 0.1; otherwise remains the same.  
(ii) If β<−
i
avei
u
uu , agent i increases its CF by 0.1 if it is 
less or equal than 0.9; otherwise it remains the same.    
(iii) If βα ≥−≥
i
avei
u
uu , agent i’s CF remains unchanged.  
The value of α and β  need to be carefully chosen and 
in this paper we set 3.0=α  and 3.0−=β . 
 
5.4. Agent’s new bid price 
After fulfilling a batch of jobs, the agent will adjust its 
unit bid price for the next batch of jobs. Let ij'ρ  and 
'
iCF be agent i’s unit bid price for sub-job j and CF for the 
next batch jobs respectively, then we have 
)(*' minmax'max ijijiijij CF ρρρρ −−= . Clearly, when the agent is 
completely cooperative, it will use minijρ  as the unit bid 
price for the next batch of jobs. When the agent is fully 
selfish, it will use maxijρ  as the unit bid price.  
 
6. Experimental results 
We compare our proposed two-level coalition 
formation mechanism with the standard one-level 
coalition formation algorithm, which has shown to obtain 
very promising results in our previous research [2]. The 
experimental results show that with the two-level coalition 
formation structure, it will not only increase the overall 
profit of the system, but also increase the individual profit 
of most participating agents. The results also show that it 
is better for an agent to be partially cooperative rather 
than being fully cooperative or self-interested in order to 
maximize its profit. 
Table 1 shows the experimental result of comparing the 
two-level coalition formation mechanism with one-level 
approach. The first column is the number of jobs in the 
system. The second column is the number of feasible 
coalitions that have been successfully formed under one-
level and two-level approaches. The third column is the 
ratio of total profit of two-level approach over that of one-
level approach. The last column shows the percentage of 
agents who obtain higher profits in two-level approach 
than in one-level approach. This table shows that the two-
level coalition formation framework increases the total 
profit of the system as more feasible coalitions have been 
formed. At the same time, the majority of agents are also 
more profitable from this two-level approach. 
 We also study how an agent’s attitude toward 
negotiation affects its own profit. Here we choose the test 
instance of 30 jobs and arbitrarily select some agents 
whose CF values are changed from 0 to 1. Figure 1 shows 
the relationship between an agent’s Profit (y-axis) and its 
corresponding CF (x-axis). Observe that it is better for an 
agent to adopt a partial level of cooperativeness instead of 
being fully cooperative or self-interested in order to 
maximize its profit. Other agents’ Profit-CF curves also 
follow a similar phenomenon.  
 
Table 1: Comparison of two coalition formation 
mechanisms 
 
No. of 
Jobs 
No. Feasible 
Coalitions 
Total Profit 
Ratio 
Benefiting 
Agents(%) 
10 4   vs  9 2.93 70% 
20 9   vs 16 2.30 70% 
30 12  vs  26 2.15 83% 
40 16  vs  32 2.02 77% 
50 20  vs  43 2.25 68% 
   
 
Figure 1: Profit versus CF curve 
7. Conclusion  
Experimental results show that our two-level approach 
outperforms the one-level approach in terms of total 
profits as well as the individual profit of most 
participating agents. It also suggests an intermediate level 
of cooperativeness toward negotiation yields higher profit 
than the extremes. Note that although our approach 
increases the total profit of the system and the individual 
profit of most agents, there are still a number of agents 
whose profits decrease under this approach. An 
interesting extension of this paper is to provide a better 
payoff distribution protocol among agents so that more if 
not all agents would benefit from this two-level approach. 
Another interesting research is to formalize a more 
sophisticated mechanism which can suggest the degree of 
cooperativeness an agent should adopt toward negotiation 
in order to maximize its own profit. 
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